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I
would like to begin by thanking Bob Eisenbeis, Fred Furlong, and the other orga-
nizers of this conference for inviting me to discuss Bob DeYoung’s paper. 
My strategy for commenting on Bob’s remarks is the following. I assumed (quite
correctly, I would say) that Bob would do an excellent job presenting his views, and
thus there would be little value added in my trying to summarize what he had said. So,
if I were looking at the U.S. banking and financial system in 1986 and in 2006, what
aspects would I notice were really different? Thus, my remarks this afternoon are based
on my list, and along the way I will use them to comment on Bob’s remarks. Also, please
note that everything I am about to say is my own opinion and no one else’s.
In my judgment, the most notable contrast between the U.S. banking system of
today and that of 1986 is today’s banking system’s remarkable resiliency and health
despite some significant shocks. Remember, in 1986, 205 banks and savings and loans
failed. And that wasn’t even the peak—that was reached in 1989 when a total of 533
banks and savings and loans failed. Not until 1993 did the annual number of bank fail-
ures drop well below 100. In recent years you might say we have become quite spoiled,
with rates of bank failure of fewer than five institutions per year.
But this low rate of bank failures is not the result of calm in the financial world
since 1993. Indeed, since the mid-1990s we have had several shocks, such as the
Russian debt default in the fall of 1998 and the Asian debt crisis shortly thereafter; the
recession of 2001–02, which, while relatively mild, was followed by an unusually slow
recovery; the stock market correction that I am sure we all remember; and, of course,
September 11 and the geopolitical uncertainty of recent years. Despite these and other
events, the vast majority of U.S. banks have remained unusually healthy, with strong
rates of return on both equity and assets, solid capital ratios, and strong reserves. 
To what do we owe this outstanding performance? No doubt there are many rea-
sons for our current good fortune, including good monetary policy, good lessons
learned by bankers and other market participants, and good luck. But I also believe
that a number of bank supervisory reforms have been implemented that have made
a difference. Thus, the second item on my list is a changed supervisory environment.
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What items would I highlight here? First on my list is the emphasis on strong cap-
ital positions that began about 1986 and that resulted in the Basel I international capital
accord of 1988. The accord helped to focus supervisors and the industry on the
importance of adequate capital for bank safety and soundness. Indeed, it was a de
facto increase in capital standards for a number of depository institutions, particularly
large banks. Second, the accord also emphasized the importance of making supervi-
sory standards sensitive to an individual institution’s risk and thus ushered in what
we now call risk-focused supervision. Last, the international nature of the accord meant
that it explicitly recognized the increasing globalization of banking and financial markets. 
December 1991 saw enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA). This massive act contained critical reforms, many of
which had been recommended in Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking. FDICIA
required that bank supervisors take prompt corrective action, or PCA, against troubled
depositories. PCA’s incentives for deterring moral hazard and limiting taxpayer losses
were reinforced by the least-cost-resolution requirements of FDICIA. Although the
act provided for certain exceptions to this charge to the FDIC, the general thrust of
least-cost resolution was to encourage market discipline by putting uninsured depos-
itors and other uninsured creditors at greater risk. Indeed, according to the FDIC,
uninsured depositors have suffered losses in more than 70 percent of bank failures
since 1993, and all resolutions were consistent with least cost. 
Not surprisingly, research suggests that market discipline has increased in the post-
FDICIA period. Bob mentions this result, but I think it deserves more highlighting.
Market discipline is a powerful tool for deterring excessive risk taking. Indeed, one of
FDICIA’s most important reforms, PCA, was designed to make supervisors mimic
what the market would do as a bank’s financial condition deteriorated. The fact that
market discipline appears to have increased in the post-FDICIA period is, I would say,
a very positive development.
The so-called systemic risk exception in FDICIA has been one of the act’s most
controversial provisions. However, in my view the strict conditions under which this
provision can be exercised have exerted a restraining influence on supervisors,
although I confess the exception has yet to be put to a true test. Still, I would argue
that, to date, this provision has also supported improved market discipline.
FDICIA required the FDIC to implement a system of risk-based deposit insur-
ance premiums, something that many economists had long advocated. This require-
ment also reinforced the notion that bank supervision should be risk focused.
Unfortunately, the Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996 essentially removed this
authority, and the vast majority of insured depositories have paid zero premiums
since that time. However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005
breathed new life into risk-based premiums, and the FDIC currently has a proposal
out for public comment. While I am personally quite disappointed with what the FDIC
is proposing, it certainly is superior to a system of zero pricing.
Another significant change in the banking and financial landscape, and another
reason I would highlight for the banking system being so resilient and healthy, is the
impressive improvements in risk measurement and management and the growing
adoption of these technologies by mostly large banks and other large financial inter-
mediaries over the last ten years. Truly, risk measurement and management today
are a far cry from that practiced in 1986. Careful judgment by human beings is
still, and I believe will always be, required. But I think there is no doubt that a much
deeper analytical and quantitative understanding of risk is possible today than ever
before. Indeed, the attempt to devise a new Basel Capital Accord is, despite all its
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controversy, an attempt to recognize and encourage these developments in both the
private and public sectors.
Improved risk measurement and management have been supported and encour-
aged by the growth of syndicated loans and securitized assets and the invention of
entirely new financial instruments, such as credit derivatives, that greatly aid the dis-
persion of risk to those most willing and able to bear it. Such developments no doubt
bring their own problems and concerns, but it seems clear to me that net benefits
have been provided.
The importance of syndicated loans, securitized assets, and over-the-counter
derivatives brings me to my next major difference between 1986 and today: the
expanded importance of financial markets, financial market prices, and nonbank
financial intermediaries. One significant implication of this development is the
increased importance of the liquidity of the markets for a wider range of financial
assets for thinking about such subjects as the nature of systemic risk. 
Along with the increased importance of financial markets has come an impressive
array of nonbank providers of financial services. Some of these, such as investment
banks and insurance companies, have long been with us. But others, such as hedge
funds and huge government-sponsored enterprises, are relatively new. The evolution of
such institutions has had far-reaching effects for banks, people who study banks, and for
those of us who worry about such matters as financial stability and competition. 
Now let me turn my attention to deregulation. As Bob has indicated, the twenty
years since the publication of Perspectives have seen some pretty impressive dereg-
ulation in the U.S. financial sector. 
In the post-1986 period, I would highlight the same two acts that Bob empha-
sized: the relaxation of most restrictions on interstate banking in the Riegle-Neal Act
of 1994 and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions on most combinations
of commercial and investment banking in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Both
of these acts were the culmination of a long process, and both have profoundly
changed the banking and financial landscape. The Riegle-Neal Act ended the balka-
nization of the U.S. banking system dating back to the founding of our republic,
sparked the consolidation and restructuring of the U.S. banking system, facilitated
risk-reducing geographic diversification and other efficiencies, and sharply raised the
level of competition in many banking markets. Gramm-Leach-Bliley officially recog-
nized the increasing blurring of distinctions between commercial and investment
banking, sparked its own wave of financial consolidation, facilitated risk-reducing
product diversification and other efficiencies, and sharply raised the level of compe-
tition in a variety of financial markets. 
Bob has appropriately emphasized the next item on my list: the major consoli-
dation of the banking industry that has occurred since 1986. I’ll quickly review some
well-known facts. First, the number of banking organizations has declined quite signif-
icantly. Since 1986 the number of banking organizations has declined by 40 percent.
Second, as Bob points out, the national share of banking assets (or deposits) held by
the largest organizations has risen steeply. It really doesn’t make much difference
how you look at it. 
Next on my list is globalization, a hot topic these days. I will resist the temptation
to say anything more about globalization, since I know that one of our newest Federal
Reserve governors, Randy Kroszner, will be speaking to us about cross-border bank-
ing before dinner tonight.
However, I would like to spend a couple of minutes talking about the next item
on my list, which is also on Bob’s: the greatly intensified level of competition that we
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observe in banking today relative to 1986.
Virtually all of the factors that I have dis-
cussed thus far, including much of the
consolidation that has occurred, have led
to this intensification of competition from,
maybe, category 1 in 1986 to category 4 in
2006. Bob covers a lot of this topic, but I
would like to point out some more facts
that I think are interesting and that pro-
vide a little different perspective on some
of the factors behind competition in today’s
banking markets. 
One of the most interesting facts, I
think, is one that Bob pointed out: average
local market concentration has stayed
largely unchanged despite all the other
changes over the past twenty years. Bob showed you one figure that combined urban
and rural markets, but you get the same picture if you separate the two types of mar-
kets. Moreover, you get the same picture if you look at more intuitive measures of
concentration, such as the average three-firm concentration ratio or the average
number of banking organizations in a market.
But now I want to drill down a little deeper and ask, Are local markets really all
that important still? And I want to argue that the answer is yes—and no. Indeed, I
think the situation is more complex than at least some of us may have thought, and
thus I believe that this area deserves further research. 
I want to look briefly at two sets of bank customers that I think sometimes get
short-changed by finance researchers, but who are clearly very important to the
economy: small businesses and households.
Starting with small businesses, consider some data from the Federal Reserve’s 1993,
1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances (SSBF). Table 1 shows the percent-
age of small businesses that use depository and nondepository providers of financial ser-
vices as well as the percentage that use a depository institution within ten miles of their
business and a nondepository institution within ten miles of their business. 
What are my takeaways? First, depository institutions (line 1) and local deposi-
tories (line 2) have been and remain really important. Second, nondepository institu-
tions (line 3) are growing in importance (a fairly recent phenomenon), but they still
are not as important as depositories. Third, local nondepositories (line 4), have never
been all that important, and their importance seems to be declining.
Another interesting question is, What does all this mean for the future of local
community banks and the importance of relationship finance? Bob highlighted this as
well and suggested that our traditional notions of “relationship finance” should be
changing as the conventional division of labor between large and small banks begins
to blur. I very much agree with that view, but I think we need to be careful about just
how fast we think things are changing.
So, consider this set of facts. The figure (on the next page) again uses the Fed’s
1993, 1998, and 2003 SSBFs. It shows the percentage of small businesses that use
community banks (less than $1 billion in real total assets) and that use noncommunity
banks. (Please note that the observations in the figure represent small business–bank
pairs; thus, because small businesses sometimes have relationships with more than
one bank, the percentages can total more than 100 percent.) 
Table 1
Small Businesses’ Use of 
Financial Service Providers
Small businesses that 
use at least one . . . 1993 1998 2003
1. Depository 97 96 96
2. Within 10 miles of 
business 89 87 87
3. Nondepository 41 41 54
4. Within 10 miles of 
business 24 16 20
Note: Usage is shown as a percentage of small businesses.
Source: Survey of Small Business Finances
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My  takeaways  are  that,  first,  small
businesses’  use  of  community  banks  is
declining but at a gradual rate. Still, com-
munity banks should probably be worried.
Second, small businesses’ use of larger
banks is increasing but also at a gradual
rate. Third, change is certainly occurring,
but perhaps we need to better understand
why it is occurring relatively slowly.
What about households? Table 2, for-
matted  similarly  to  Table  1,  uses  the
Federal  Reserve’s  Surveys  of  Consumer
Finances from 1989 (only three years after
Perspectives was published) through 2004.
Table 2 shows that, first, as with small
businesses, depository institutions (line 1)
have  been  and  remain  important  (that
98–99 percent is a rock solid number).
Second, as with small businesses, local
depositories (line 2) have been and remain
important. Third, nondepository institutions (line 3) are growing in importance and
now appear to be more important for households than for small businesses. Fourth,
as with small businesses, local nondepositories (line 4) have never been especially
important, and their importance seems to be declining.
The next item on my list in some ways underlies all of the others and has been
highlighted by Bob and many others: technological change. By technological change
I mean both hardware and software and the invention of new financial instruments
and the intellectual tools needed to price them.
I want to comment very briefly on one small aspect of technological change that
Bob did not emphasize that I think is important for understanding banking in 2006. I
believe it illustrates that we still have a lot to learn. The process by which techno-
logical change becomes embedded in production and consumption decisions has long
fascinated and been considered important by economists. Despite this attention, the
process remains a considerable mystery, and households’ use of financial services
technologies is no exception. For example, many academics, regulators, and bankers
have long forecast that technological change would kill the paper check and make
brick-and-mortar branches obsolete. However, here we are in August 2006 and the
paper check is still with us, the smart card has been a flop, and the number of brick-
and-mortar branches is ever increasing. 
In 1995 the Fed began using its Survey of Consumer Finances to ask households
about their use of various technologies, including computers, to conduct business with
their financial institutions. Table 3 summarizes some of these findings. It lists the per-
centage of households holding an account with at least one financial institution that
report using various technologies to conduct business with any financial institution. 
I have time to highlight only two rows here—the “in person” visit and the “com-
puter.” In each year since 1995, the most common technology used is the in-person
visit. Is it any wonder that banks are building branches? But change is certainly under
way. For example, in 1995 barely 4 percent of households said they used the com-
puter to consume financial services. Although there was little change in 1998, by
2001 the percentage using the computer had jumped to 19 percent, and in 2004 it
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Bank Usage by Small Businesses
Note: Usage is shown as a percentage of small businesses that use at
least one commercial bank or thrift. “Community banks” are commercial
bank or thrift organizations with less than $1 billion in total real assets.
Source: Survey of Small Business Finances
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had reached an impressive 34 percent. Moreover, other types of electronic technolo-
gies, such as direct deposit, the ATM, and preauthorized debits, are increasingly used
by households. Still, the older technologies are hanging in there. Indeed, one of my
takeaways from these data is that the pace of adoption of technological change by
households tends to be gradual. In addition, even when new technologies start to gain
more widespread acceptance, old technologies are abandoned rather slowly, and
many users perhaps view the old and the new technologies more as complements
than as substitutes.
The final item on my list returns to the first item and begins to poach on Mark
Flannery’s territory tomorrow morning. For that reason, and because my time is up,
I will only raise the issue. 
I began my remarks by observing that since the mid-1990s, the U.S. banking and
financial system has remained remarkably resilient and stable, and I asserted that a
number of the safety and soundness policies put in place since the late 1980s were
partially responsible. My final observation is in the form of two questions: Along with
all of the other changes we have observed over the past twenty years, has the nature
of systemic risk changed? And are we ready for any changes that have occurred?
Table 2 
Households’ Use of Financial Service Providers
Households that 
use at least one . . . 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
1. Depository 99.1 98.4 98.7 97.8 98.8 98.4
2. Within 10 miles 
of household 78.3 75.3 74.0 74.0 74.2 74.7
3. Nondepository 27.4 43.7 47.5 63.9 61.1 66.7
4. Within 10 miles 
of household 38.8 33.6 29.1 26.6 26.0 25.5
Note: Usage is shown as a percentage of households.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances
Table 3
Technologies Used by Households Conducting 
Business with a Financial Institution
Technology 1995 1998 2001 2004
In person 86.9 80.4 77.8 77.9
Mail 57.5 54.7 50.7 50.9
Telephone 26.2 50.2 49.3 49.4
ATM 34.3 53.1 57.2 64.9
Direct deposit 50.8 65.4 72.2 75.4
Preauthorized debit 23.7 42.0 43.8 50.5
Computer 3.8 6.3 19.2 33.6
Note: Usage is shown as a percentage of households that hold an account with at least one institution.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances
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The answers to these questions, while fundamental to our business and to this
conference, are, I think, not easy. Earlier in my remarks I suggested that the deter-
minants of market liquidity is perhaps a topic that needs and deserves more research.
No doubt there are others. Indeed, unease about the answers to my questions lies, I
suspect, at the heart of contemporary concerns about “financial stability.” 
But these are topics for another day. Until then, I once again thank the organiz-
ers of this conference for asking me to discuss Bob DeYoung’s paper, and I thank you
for your attention.
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